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I. Introduction. 
Thomas More, speaking through Raphael Hythlodaeus, ends his description of 
the institutions, manners and customs of the utopians saying: «Now I have 
described to you, as exactly as I could, the structure of that commonwealth 
which I judge not merely the best but the only one which can rightly claim the 
name of a commonwealth» (1964, 146). What did Raphael see in the island of 
Utopia as if to judge not merely the best but the only commonwealth? Did he 
see a civitas libera where people enjoyed individual freedoms as one of the 
profits to be derived from living in a well-ordered society? 
 
An interpretation of growing influence in some circles is that utopian thought is 
bound to lead to tyranny, violence and totalitarianism. The reading of utopian 
thought I am suggesting attempts to refute this idea. In my opinion, human 
rights are not absent in literary utopias because a number of early modern 
utopian authors were aware of the main legal, political, economical and religious 
discussions of their context and they reflected them in their literary utopias. The 
limits of the action of the State and the freedom from arbitrary dominance -what 
we today call human rights- were part of this context of ideas and discussion. In 
this paper I would like to explain how the vindication of individual freedoms and 
some of the main issues in the history of human rights have been expressed 
and can be found in literary utopias that have shaped utopian thought since the 
sixteenth-century. In my opinion, the status of human rights is a recurrent theme 
through the history of utopian thought because proposals for ideal societies 
necessarily involve recognition, protection and development of those individual 
freedoms which are otherwise denied. 
                                                 
∗
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In a number of ways, the search for the ideal society can be seen as a 
vindication of human rights and an expression of the satisfaction of basic needs. 
The ideal society can claim to be a better society since the people who live in it 
have rights and freedoms denied or basic needs not covered in real life. 
Furthermore, what we dislike in dystopias such as 1984 and Brave New World 
is that human dignity is denied. It could even be said that the history of human 
rights and utopian thought run in parallel since both demand de optimo rei 
publicae. 
 
The first section of the paper deals with the general connection between human 
rights and utopian thought as well as specific variations in respect to each 
author, each context and each ideal society model. The second section 
explores how we should study the question of human rights inside the model of 
ideal society that emerges from the Utopia of Thomas More in which law is an 
essential tool for setting up and maintaining the ideal society. 
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II. Human rights and utopian political thought. 
If we look at the relationship between human rights and utopian thought from a 
broad perspective, it might be thought that the relationship is unproblematic 
because the first picture one has of the ideal society is the vision of paradise, 
where humanity is liberated from its chains (Ramiro Avilés, 2001a, 226). If we 
have this picture in mind, it is difficult to see anything else than 
complementariness between utopian thought and human rights.  
 
But, also from the broad perspective, there is another kind of connection 
between human rights and utopian thought based on absence and 
disagreement. As in the history of utopian thought, where the world is turned 
upside down and scarcity is converted into abundance (Sargent, 1994, 3-4), the 
statutes including human rights shows us how human rights are lacking in daily 
life. Besides, if reality is not acceptable, it is impossible to understand the 
struggle for human rights. So, the struggle for and the achievement of human 
rights by individuals or groups are explained from the perspective of alienation 
from the existing political system, which denies rights and freedoms (Mugerza, 
1997, 60). As a result, the recognition of new rights or the expansion of the 
number of rightholders has always been, in some sense, utopian.  
 
Utopian thought then can be seen as an expression of the vindications of the 
excluded, meaning, those who were neither actively involved in the process of 
governing nor had any say in choosing those who rule over them or had not 
seen their rights recognized in the legal system (Harris, 2001, 1). Nevertheless, 
those who were excluded had real political vindications because, as Tim Harris 
puts it, «ordinary men and women did have opinions about how duly constituted 
authority was supposed to be exercised, and how those who governed were 
supposed to rule» (2001, 6). 
 
Legal rules including new rights, like those enacted by King Utopus for the 
island of Utopia, can be seen as part of the process of awakening to a new 
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world, as the ferment of an eunomic model of society: «They have adopted such 
institutions of life as have laid the foundations of the commonwealth not only 
most happily, but also to last forever, as far as human prescience can forecast» 
(1964, 151). The main aim of any law-maker or founding father, as Utopus was, 
may be seen as the establishment of a political system respectful to human 
rights. So, when any law-maker plans to reform any statute or to establish a 
system of government, she or he visualises a society that is not yet but could 
be. The law-maker envisages their proposed new statutes in the context of a 
freer, fairer and more equal society. But, when the new legal system is realised, 
its utopian character disappears because it has achieved a topos. Moreover, 
enacting these new laws and statutes will be a unique test since their imputed 
goodness will be tested and we will know whether we have built an earthly 
paradise or hell (Peces-Barba & Ramiro Avilés, 2004, 14). 
 
On the other hand, if we look at the relationship from a narrow perspective, such 
complementariness depends on three factors: the model of ideal society, the 
particular author and the specific context. As José Antonio Maravall tells us, 
utopian thought enacts a comparison between «the experience of the real city 
where in fact men live» and «the yearning for the ideal society that directs us 
toward stronger or less strong aspirations for reform». This aspiration «appears 
in different forms from the earliest years of Western history» (1976, 13-14). To 
be precise, and according to the typology of J.C. Davis, there are five models of 
ideal society. They are Cockaigne, Arcadia, Perfect Moral Commonwealth, 
Millennium and Utopia (1981, 20-40). Due both to the differences among them 
and to how society and law are described, each ideal society model sets out a 
distinctive relationship with human rights (Ramiro Avilés, 2002, 233-254). In 
Utopia, which embodies an ideal society by means of the perfection of its legal, 
bureaucratic and formal structures (Davis, 1968, 174), law and State appear to 
be necessary elements for accomplishing social reform and setting up a new 
way of governing and administering goods and people: «He rehearsed not a few 
points from which our cities, nations, races and kingdoms may take example for 
the correction of their errors» (More, 1964, 15). As Giampaolo Zucchini asserts, 
the Renaissance utopists aimed at achieving earthly happiness through a new 
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model of society and/or an alternative State (1986, 409). In this model of ideal 
society, according to Miriam Eliav-Feldon, «law is a subject that received a 
great deal of attention from the utopists and deserves close examination» 
(1982, 110). As stated in Utopia: «This is the law and this is the procedure in the 
matter, as I have described to you» (1964, 33). 
 
As far as the authors are concerned, although all have tried to define de optimo 
rei publicae, not all of them have given the same solution for solving the legal, 
political, economical or religious problems that, according to them, lie at the root 
of social imperfection. Each author had his own particular point of view and 
solution. So, for instance, Thomas More and Tommaso Campanella agree with 
each other on the communal property issue, as against James Harrington and 
his system of private property, but More and Campanella disagree on liberty of 
conscience, and we can find More and Harrington sharing a similar opinion on 
this point (Ramiro Avilés, 2002, 270-271, 417). And, as far as the historical 
context the utopian text is written, the complementarity between human rights 
and utopian thought will be reformulated from time to time because human 
rights are historical and then the rights and freedoms claimed in each literary 
utopia will express historical circumstances. So, for instance, if we read 
Ecotopia written by Ernest Callenbach in 1975, we  see the new environmental 
rights, the fourth generation of human rights, included (Ramiro Avilés, 2001b). 
Therefore, complementarity will depend for its detailed expression on the 
particular circumstances and context in which literary utopia authors find 
themselves. 
 
One objection to the complementarity of utopian thought and human rights 
might be that Utopian model of ideal society attempts to control all behaviour 
and this control is achieved through strict and inflexible enforcement of rules: 
«Being under the eyes of all, people are bound either to be performing the usual 
labor or to be enjoying their leisure in a fashion not without decency» (More, 
1964, 83). The Utopian model of ideal society envisages a system of legal rules 
controlling public and private behaviour (Ramiro Avilés, 2001a, 242). In More’s 
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Utopia and Campanella’s La Città del Sole, the State rules everything, even the 
most personal sphere (Tasso, 1999, 310). Legal comprehensiveness is 
therefore one of the utopian system’s characteristics, aspiring to rule all possible 
human actions (Raz, 1991, 175-176). There is normative intervention from birth 
to death and, according to Gerrard Winstanley, «There will be Rules made for 
every action a man can do» (1965, 512). In the sixteenth- and seventeenth-
centuries, when human rights and utopian thought encounter one another, 
some behaviour, nowadays considered private, was regulated and other kinds 
of behaviour, nowadays considered public, first began to be regulated1. Hyper-
regulation or comprehensiveness was not thought strange because the modern 
State had to increase its presence in society with new institutions and new 
areas of control (Oestreich, 1982, 138). According to J.C. Davis, in Utopia 
«every aspect of life must be regulated in a coordinated way. Institutions, 
educational programmes, legal sanctions, and custom must converge to the 
desired end, and all of these processes must operate impersonally and 
continuously» (1991, 333). In this sense, Utopian society operates on a general 
rule, as Lyman T. Sargent has stated, «if the law did not say expressly that you 
could do something, you could not do it» (1975, 91). Comprehensiveness in 
Utopia is a product of the idea that every action may be a possible cause of 
social disorder and that there should therefore be no differentiation between the 
public and private spheres: «In Utopia, where nothing is private, they seriously 
concern themselves with public affairs» (More, 1964, 146). The amalgamation 
of the spheres went further because in that period, according to Gerald 
Oestreich, «State and society were not separate entities, as they were 
considered to be in the early nineteenth-century, but formed a unity» (1982, 
160). 
 
The question of whether human beings are really free in early modern Utopian 
model of ideal society, where every action may be controlled, must then be 
seen in a historical perspective. This has been extensively debated. Some 
scholars, such as Isaiah Berlin and Schlomo Avineri, have argued that there is 
                                                 
1
 We can see this in Utopia when marriage rules are described: «In choosing mates, they seriously and 
strictly espouse a custom which seemed to us very foolish and extremely ridiculous» (1964, 110). 
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not freedom but slavery in utopia.  The answer to this affirmation has been that, 
in contrast with twentieth-century attitudes, it was not assumed in early modern 
European political thought that authority and liberty were antithetical (Davis, 
1993a, 28). According to J.C. Davis, «we should not automatically assume that 
liberty and authority are antithetical [and] we should not automatically identify 
liberty with personal autonomy or individual self-expression, self realization» 
(1992, 513) if we wish to understand how it is possible to reconcile utopian 
thought and human rights within an early modern context. When Isaiah Berlin 
states that legal coercion is tantamount to depriving some of their freedom 
(1996, 121), or when Schlomo Avineri states that totalitarianism permeates 
every aspect of daily life in utopia (1962, 287), we may be witnessing acts of 
anachronism. These views may be set aside because during the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-centuries, «in terms of civil liberty a congruence between liberty 
and law was sought in order to defend the subject from will and power (…) the 
essence of freedom was to live under known rules and not to be subject to the 
arbitrary wills of other men was a commonplace formulation of the seventeenth 
century well before John Locke gave his own utterance to it» (Davis, 1993a, 
28). The problem arises, according to J.C. Davis, because Locke’s thesis on 
freedom (no arbitrary dominance), has been neglected and Hobbes’ thesis on 
freedom (no interference), has been adopted and therefore the western idea of 
freedom was become incompatible with utopian social order (1981, 385)2. If we 
accept that freedom and authority were not antithetical and that freedom was 
achieved by living under known rules in society enabling people to enjoy their 
rights and freedoms and protecting them from tyranny, laws in Utopia become 
tools of liberation not of oppression. These were recurrenting ideas in the 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries because the State and law were not seen 
as negative but as positive tools for social reform (Bobbio, 1994, 176-179). As 
J.C. Davis affirms, «freedom and law walked hand in hand offering mutual 
protection against will, arbitrary power and tyranny» (1992, 513) and «forms 
were about regularity and thereby about predictability. This was the principal 
way in which they induced and confirmed a sense of order. Constitutional 
convention, due process, the rule of law -in all their formality- reconciled liberty 
                                                 
2
 John Locke, Second Treaty on Civil Government, chapter 4, paragraph 22; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 
II, 21. 
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and authority, constraining the former from the excesses of licence and the 
latter from the arbitrariness of tyranny» (Davis, 1993b, 282). In J.C. Davis 
opinion, «in Utopia, formality not only reconciled liberty and authority, but also 
eliminated the arbitrary and contingent from social life (...) utopian formality 
guaranteed and extended the liberty of utopian citizens» (1993a, 29). 
 
We should admit, therefore, that in early modern Utopian societies it was 
possible to find a kind of mixture among liberté des anciens and liberté des 
modernes, if we use the terminology of Benjamin Constant, or among positive 
freedom and negative freedom, if we use the terminology of Isaiah Berlin, or 
freedom from arbitrary dominance, if we use the terminology of John Locke and 
republicanism (Pettit, 1997; Skinner, 1998; Barranco Avilés, 2000). In my 
opinion, the last of these is the kind of freedom that accords better with the 
Utopian model of ideal society since it is based on the idea that legal restrictions 
in a well ordered society are not arbitrary dominance. 
 
On the other hand, J.C. Davis has also argued that participatory freedom was 
not a priority because the utopian designer saw it «as always involving risks too 
great to be sustained and his pessimistic view of the nature of man reinforces 
that attitude. Men will choose wickedly, selfishly and foolishly» (1981, 381). I 
disagree because, in my opinion, if we take into account the notion of freedom 
from arbitrary dominance, at the beginning of the history of the Utopian model 
we can find a precursor of the free state «in which the actions of the body politic 
are determined by the will of the members as a whole» (Skinner, 1998, 26). The 
will of the people has no mystery but was simply «the sum of the wills of each 
individual citizen» (Skinner, 1998, 28-29). It is possible that, from the point of 
view of the freedom from arbitrary dominance, political participation was a 
valuable tool in early modern utopia thought. Thomas More in his Utopia had 
put forward one possible solution to the exercise of a right of participation in the 
making of laws when utopians live in self-governing cities that manage their own 
affairs by means of elected magistrates (syphogrant and tranibor): «Every thirty 
families choose annually an official whom in their ancient language they call a 
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syphogrant (...) Over ten syphogrants with their families is set a person once 
call a tranibor (...) The whole body of syphograns, in number two hundred, 
having sworn to choose the man whom they judge most useful, by secret 
balloting to appoint a governor (...) The tranibors enter into consultation with the 
governor every other day and sometimes, if need arises, oftener. They take 
counsel about the commonwealth (...) It is provided that nothing concerning the 
commonwealth be ratified if it has not been discussed in the senate three days 
before the passing of the decree» (1964, 67). As we can see, the senate of the 
island of Utopia is a national assembly of the more virtuous chosen by the 
families to legislate on their behalf. Later, and James Harrington’s The 
Commonwealth of Oceana is also a good example, in literary utopias such as 
L’An 2440. Rêve s’il en fut jamais by Luis-Sébastien Mercier, whose final 
version was published in 1786, we can find suitable instruments for a 
contemporary political participation with citizens passing statutes in Parliament, 
developing further the idea of civic personae (Furet, 1998, 63; Ramiro Avilés, 
2002, 332-342). 
 
III. Human rights in Utopia. 
Utopia is that ideal society model in which human rights feature in greater 
complexity, since this model retains the State and law as a part of its ideal 
society vision. The importance of this arises because human rights are 
traditionally seen as limits to the action of the State. In Utopia, ambiguity over 
this issue arises because the State is ideal (Ramiro Avilés, 2002, 405-410). As 
Barbara Goodwin states, «if modern utopias do not dwell overmuch on civil 
rights, it is because these safeguards against a growing states apparatus would 
be superfluous in a utopian society lacking the problem» (1980, 397). 
Nevertheless, literary utopias address some of the main issues in the history of 
human rights in their quest to remove arbitrary dominance: a struggle for the 
rule of law, liberty of conscience, the humanization of criminal law, property 
rights, resistance to oppression and the role of natural rights. 
 
a.) The struggle for the rule of law. 
 10 
The struggle for the rule of law is the starting point for a new way of 
understanding the relationship between utopian thought and law (Ramiro Avilés, 
2001a). In the real world the power of the State might be potentially limitless 
and princeps legibus solutus est a dominant idea, but in ideal societies like 
those visualised by Thomas More and James Harrington the power of the ruler 
had limits. According to James Harrington, «But Leviathan [Hobbes], though he 
seems to skew at antiquity, following his furious master Carneades, hath caught 
hold of the public sword, unto which he reduceth all manner and matter of 
government (...) But as he said of the law that without this sword it is but paper, 
so might have thought of this sword that without an hand it is but cold iron (...) 
Again, if the liberty of a man consist in the empire of his reason, the absence 
whereof would betray him unto bondage of his passions; then the liberty of a 
commonwealth consisteth in the empire of her laws, the absence whereof would 
betray her unto the lusts of tyrants» (1977, 165, 170). So, Utopia is an example 
of a well-ordered government, because it is governed by laws and not by arms. 
Government is not a personal matter, but an institutional one and the rulers are 
not above the law (Ferguson, 1965, 16). Tyranny is outlawed and most utopists 
equate it with government by arms. Gerrard Winstanley in The Law of Freedom 
in a Platform makes this connection clear when he affirms: «the Kings Power 
lies in his Laws, not in the Name (…) The Tyrants in all ages have made use of 
this mans name» (1965, 527, 534). In this same sense James Harrington 
states: «Government (to define it de jure or according to ancient prudence) is an 
art whereby a civil society of men is instituted and preserved upon the 
foundation of common right or interest, or (to follow Aristotle and Livy) it is the 
empire of laws and not of men» (1977, 161). So, the morality and personality of 
the ruler is not the most relevant element for attaining the best form for the 
commonwealth; the effectiveness of the institutional framework is vital. This is 
the point at which George Logan sees Thomas More diverging from his friends, 
«humanists, and especially the northern humanists with whom More was 
affiliated, were strongly committed to a personal rather than an institutional view 
of politics (…) More is going to stress instead the importance of non-personal 
factors –mores and institutions– in securing good government» (1983, 38-39). 
In this sense, the inhabitants of the island of Utopia «are infinitely better than 
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any other people at the time, but they are not significantly better by nature; they 
are better because their social institutions are better» (Sargent, 1975, 89). 
 
The struggle for the rule of law entailed the reform of the whole legal system 
because, as Miriam Eliav-Feldon states, «society, according to our writers, can 
be reformed only through good laws and good institutions that will protect men 
from evil within them. The serious utopia is, in fact, a complex legal network of 
such close mesh as to leave individuals with very little freedom of action». And 
she concludes, «all our utopists, irrespective of their country, denomination, or 
particular background, acknowledged the widespread discontent with the 
existing legal system and, except for those who rejected the entire subject and 
took refuge in fantasy, devoted much thought and space in their descriptions of 
imaginary societies to offering an alternative in the form of an ideal legal 
system» (1982, 109-111). A radical reform of society would be attained by the 
abolition of unfair and imperfect rules and by adopting new ones. Accordingly, 
criticism of the law characterises many literary utopias of the time. Robert 
Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy illustrates this well: «To see so many lawyers, 
advocates, so many tribunals, so little justice; so many magistrates, so little care 
of the common good; so many laws, yet never more disorders…. To see often a 
most unjust man preside over justice, an impious man over religion, a most 
ignorant man decide questions of learning, a most lazy man questions of labor, 
a monster questions of humanity! To see a lamb executed, a wolf pronounce 
sentence, a robber arraigned, and a thief sit on the bench, the Judge severely 
punish others, and do worse himself!….Laws are made and not kept; or if put in 
execution, they be some silly ones that are punished» (1991, 51). The 
imperfections of the legal system so condemned are both formal and material 
(Ramiro Avilés, 2001a, 239-244). Formal imperfections derive from problems 
connected with the complexity of law enforcement and the generation of 
elaborate codes; law is imperfect because it is made up of rules which are hard 
to understand, lengthy texts, unfamiliar or unknown laws: «They have very few 
laws because very few are needed for persons so educated. The chief fault they 
find with other peoples is that almost innumerable books of laws and 
commentaries are not sufficient. They themselves think it most unfair that any 
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group of men should be bound by laws which are either too numerous to be 
read through or too obscure to be understood by anyone» (More, 1964, 114). 
The solution was to enact a code of few and comprehensible laws, which would 
be inexorably put in execution. On the other hand, the main material problem of 
the legal system historically was the separation of law and justice. According to 
Giampaolo Zucchini, the crisis of contemporary legal systems, was explicitly 
underlined in Renaissance utopias by dramatising this separation, a separation 
that the utopians wished to abolish by creating social justice founded on 
citizens’ virtue and the virtue of the new social and institutional systems (1986, 
423). As Thomas More says through Rafael Hythlodaeus, «But if this agreement 
among men is to have such force as to exempt their henchmen from the 
obligation of the commandment, although without any precedent set by God 
they take the life of those who have been ordered by human enactment to be 
put to death, will not the law of God then be valid only so far as the law of man 
permits?» (1964, 30). 
 
b.) Liberty of conscience 
Concerning liberty of conscience, utopian writers falls into two opposing camps. 
In the first one are Thomas More and James Harrington defending it, and in the 
other are Tommaso Campanella, Samuel Gott and Ludovico Agostino 
proscribing it (Ramiro Avilés, 2002, 417-432). As Raymond Trousson remarks, 
deism, the rejection of Churches and pluralism of conscience are not an 
exclusive feature of Enlightenment utopias because from Thomas More to 
Robert Burton we find the same religious tolerance and plurality, the same 
suspicious towards the Churches (1995, 20). In Utopia, Thomas More tells us 
that liberty of conscience was one of the first enactments of King Utopus: «From 
the very beginning, therefore, after he had gained the victory, he especially 
ordained that it should be lawful for every man to follow the religion of his 
choice» (1964, 133). So, in the island of Utopia «there are different kinds of 
religion not only on the island as a whole but also in each city. Some worship as 
god the sun, others the moon, others of the planet» and they do not try to deter 
others from their religion (1964, 130, 132). However, this liberty is not limitless 
since King Utopus also enacted «that no one should fall so far below the dignity 
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of human nature as to believe that soul perish with the body or that the world is 
the mere sport of chance and not governed by any divine providence» (1964, 
134). The Commonwealth of Oceana is another example of a society in which 
liberty of conscience is part of the ordini of the ideal society: «But as a 
government pretending unto liberty, and suppressing the liberty of conscience, 
which (because religion not according to a man’s conscience can as to him be 
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taken place fifty years before. In this respect, the work is associated with that 
form of millenarian writing which, in its treatment of the latter-day glory, 
emphasised the preliminary conversion of the Jews» (1981, 146). Likewise, 
Tommaso Campanella, Ludovico Agostino, Ludovico Zùccolo, Johann Valentin 
Andreae, Anthony Legrand and Johann Eberlein von Günzburg wrote books 
describing ideal societies in which liberty of conscience has no place since they 
were defending theocracies (Trousson, 1978, 395). Günzburg held, for instance, 
that any person teaching an unorthodox prayer should be beheaded (Groag 
Bell, 1967, 131) and Andreae, influenced by Calvinist Geneva, described a 
society intolerant of those faiths not accepted by the religious and civil power. 
The inhabitants of Christianopolis prayed three times a day and nobody was 
exempt from these collective acts of worship (Andreae, 1999, 173). In 
Scydromedia, a text written by Antoine Legrand, King Scydromedus warned 
against the risks attendant upon plurality of faiths and accordingly established a 
national church and with religious unity as legal obligation. He even banned 
religious controversy in order to avoid social dissensions (Ryan, 1936, 50). 
Unity was so precious that was impossible to leave any room for individual 
conscientious choice in religion because it was considered extremely dangerous 
for communal life. 
 
The Counter-Reformation and the religions wars of early modern Europe had a 
marked influence on authors in this group because with it went a demand of 
religious uniformity and intolerance of religious pluralism. Ludovico Agostino 
and Ludovico Zùccolo described ideal societies after the Council of Trent and in 
their books, Reppublica Immaginaria and Reppublica di Evandria, religion 
informed all human affairs and they manifested the intransigence of one 
expression of Roman Catholicism. In this sense, Luigi Firpo found in Ludovico 
Agostino’s ideal society a defence of counter-reformation ideals: religious 
renovation, the subordination of humankind to God, the triumph of Catholicism, 
the exaltation of Papacy, and the extermination of heresy (1957, 9). 
 
c.) The humanization of criminal law 
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The third issue in shaping the history of human rights is the humanization of 
criminal law. Although substantially the humanization process is associated with 
the eighteenth-century (Tarello, 1976, 383), from the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-centuries we can find some of the preconditions for a 
transformation of the criminal law. Renaissance humanism is full of criticism of a 
criminal law characterised by unequal application of the law, by the ambiguity of 
the criminal law, by torture, ineffectiveness of the rules and disproportionality. 
So, in Utopia we see a future Lord Chancellor rigorously attacking existing 
judicial practice and by implication anticipating its humanization when Thomas 
More says, again through Raphael Hythlodaeus, that if equity has any meaning, 
not all offenses are equal and there is no similarity or connection between killing 
a man and robbing him of a coin. And he remarks, «surely everyone knows how 
absurd and even dangerous to the commonwealth it is that a thief and a 
murderer should receive the same punishment. Since the robber sees that he is 
in as great danger if merely condemned for theft as if he were convicted of 
murder as well, this single consideration impels him to murder the man whom 
otherwise he would only have robbed. In addition to the fact that he is in no 
greater danger if caught, there is greater safety in putting the man out of the 
way and greater hope of covering up the crime if he leaves no one left to tell the 
tale. Thus, while we endeavor to terrify thieves with excessive cruelty, we urge 
them on the destruction of honest citizens» (1964, 29-30). Here in 1516 the 
theses of Beccaria and Voltaire are anticipated. 
 
d.) Property 
The question of property is also a disputed issue in early modern Utopia 
because natural shortage is a hallmark in this model of ideal society. Utopia did 
not trust nature to resolve political problems therefore it was necessary to find a 
new institutional system to generate artificial abundance, meaning equality of 
distribution, or to control the appetite for ownership. So utopists designed new 
models of property, differing between each expression of literary utopia. The 
new system will be fairer than the existing one and by means of it the utopist 
seeks social justice and the common good with property as one cornerstone of 
this ideal society model (Eliav-Feldon, 1982, 79). Thomas More, Tommaso 
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Campanella and Johann Valentin Andreae saw private property as an endemic 
illness and therefore to be abolished and replaced by a system of communal 
property. So, Thomas More, speaking again through Rafael Hythlodaeus, 
stated: «Yet surely, my dear More, to tell you candidly my heart’s sentiments, it 
appears to me that wherever you have private property and all men measure all 
thing by cash values, there is scarcely possible for a commonwealth to have 
justice or prosperity (...) I am fully persuaded that no just and even distribution 
of goods can be made and that no happiness can be found in human affairs 
unless private property is utterly abolished» (1964, 52-53). 
 
On the other hand, James Harrington in The Commonwealth of Oceana 
retained a private property system in his new model of society but one operated 
under different principles. In the new private property system, agrarian laws, 
were a key element in Oceana maintaining a new social and political equilibrium 
and preventing accumulation of an overbalance of land by the nobility (Davis, 
1981, 231-234). According to Harrington, «Fundamental laws are such as state 
what it is that a man may call his own, that is to say property, and what the 
means be whereby a man may enjoy his own, that is to say protection (...) every 
man who is at present possessed, or shall hereafter be possessed, of an estate 
in land exceeding the revenue of two* thousand pounds a year, and having 
more than one son, shall leave his lands either equally divided among them (...) 
and no man, not in present possession of lands above the value of two 
thousand pounds by the year, shall receive, enjoy (except by lawful inheritance), 
acquire or purchase unto himself lands» (1977, 230-231). 
 
e.) Resistance to tyranny 
Resistance to tyranny is also an important issue in this type of ideal society, 
reflecting the utopists concern with the perpetual maintenance of the best form 
of the commonwealth and the freedom from arbitrary dominance. As Thomas 
More warned, «well and wisely trained citizens are not everywhere to be found» 
(1964, 15) and according the problem of tyranny had to be addressed. In the 
                                                 
*
 J.C. Davis has warned me of the printer’s error in J.G.A. Pocock’s edition. 
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island of Utopia new rules had been enacted in order to prevent the corruption 
of the princeps (Fenlon, 1981, 453). So, for instance, Ademus was elected to a 
post held for life but under legal control because utopians know the prince is a 
fallible human: «The governor holds office for life, unless ousted on suspicion of 
aiming at a tyranny» (1964, 67). In the island of Utopia the law prohibited 
political debate outside the senate: «To take counsel on matters of common 
interest outside the senate or the popular assembly is considered a capital 
offense. The object of these measures, they say, is to prevent it from being 
easy, by a conspiracy between the governor and the tranibors and by tyrannous 
oppression of the people, to change the order of the commonwealth» (1964, 67-
68). True people cannot be deprived of their liberty by having its actions 
determined by the arbitrary will of anyone other than the representatives of the 
body politic. As Quentin Skinner states, «if you wish to maintain your liberty, you 
must ensure that you live under a political system in which there is no element 
of discretionary power, and hence no possibility that your civil rights will be 
dependent on the goodwill of a ruler, a ruling group, or any other agent of the 
state. You must live, in other words, under a system in which the sole power of 
making laws remains with the people or their accredited representatives, and in 
which all individual members of the body politic -rulers and citizens alike- remain 
equally subject to whatever laws they choose to impose upon themselves. If 
and only if you live under such a self-governing system will your rulers be 
deprived of any discretionary powers of coercion, and in consequence deprived 
of any tyrannical capacity to reduce you and your fellow-citizens to a condition 
of dependence on their goodwill, and hence to the status of slaves» (1998, 74-
75). 
 
Moreover, utopists think that where the rule of law is observed there will be 
political stability but tyranny, rule without the limits of the law, will be politically 
unstable. As Gerrard Winstanley declared in The Law of Freedom in a Platform, 
if the king oppressed his people, he was a tyrant and a traitor and he would be 
overthrown by a secret plot; tyranny was not immortal because inside it there 
was a rotting and putrid worm (1965, 503). 
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The fight against tyranny reflects, according to Lyman T. Sargent, the tension 
between what the prince ought to do and what he ought to refrain from doing 
(1984, 207). In this sense, in Utopia Thomas More used the dialogue between 
Thomas More dramatis personae and Rafael Hythlodaeus to discuss the limits 
of power; if the State is unavoidable, then we have to limit it. Utopia, in this 
interpretation, is a book about autocratic power and how it might be possible to 
control it. In defence of the commonwealth and the struggle against tyranny, 
Utopia advocates the primacy of the public interest. So, More denies the tyrant 
the title of king because the latter does not oppress his subjects, does not see 
them as slaves and looks for their happiness: «For this very reason, it belongs 
to the king to take more care for the welfare of his people than for his own (...) It 
is not consistent with the dignity of a king to exercise authority over beggars but 
over prosperous and happy subjects (...) to have a single person enjoy a life of 
pleasure and self-indulgence amid the groans and laments of all around him is 
to be the keeper, not of a kingdom, but of a jail» (1964, 46-47). Their critique 
avoided the use of the terms dictator or tyrannus, an exceptional and 
appreciated ruler since his objective is to safeguard the commonwealth in times 
of extreme danger (Baumann, 1985, 111). This positive vision of the dictator 
can be found in James Harrington (1977, 252-253). The utopist confronted the 
τυραννοs, that is, the tyrant who is a usurper because he rebelled against lawful 
sovereign and ruled only in his own interest (Baumann, 1985, 112). This kind of 
tyrant is, according to More, like a bad doctor because he does not know how to 
treat an illness without causing another one: «In fine, as he is an incompetent 
physician who cannot cure one disease except by creating another, so he who 
cannot reform the lives of citizens in any other way than by depriving them of 
the good things of life must admit that he does not know how to rule free men» 
(1964, 47). In the same sense, in The Isle of Pines Henry Neville found John 
Phill guilty of tyranny and he was sentenced to death (1999, 72) and Gerrard 
Winstanley appealed to the magistrates to fight against tyranny: «Therefore, the 
work of all true Magistrates is to maintain the common Law, which is the root of 
right Government, and preservation and peace to every one; and to cast out all 
self-ended principles and interests, which is Tyranny and Oppression, and 
which breaks common peace» (1965, 538). 
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f.) Natural rights 
Natural rights are a category of rights that precede both society and the ideal 
society. In my opinion, they are not relevant in early modern Utopia because 
only social life shaped by the new statutes and political institutions is significant. 
In creating, consolidating and defending a new model of society, natural rights 
cease to be relevant because people must integrate into that society setting 
aside previous rights and duties. So, for instance, rights of resistance to tyranny, 
to communal property or liberty of conscience do not exist in Utopia as natural 
rights utopians recovered when King Utopus conquered or liberated them but as 
a protections inherent in the new legal system. 
 
The legal system which matters in Utopia is the one created by men. Natural 
freedom is meaningless because early modern Utopian authors thought there 
was no freedom out of positive law, no liberty without the protection of the 
utopian construct. In Utopia the civil life of the people predominates and their 
freedom is civil (Davis, 1992, 513-514). According to Richard Tuck, «Humanist 
lawyers found it virtually impossible to talk about natural rights, and extremely 
difficult to talk about rights tout court. What was important to them was not 
natural law but humanly constructed law; not natural rights but civil remedies» 
(1979, 33). And Quentin Skinner concludes that «the notion of a state of nature, 
and the claim that this condition is one of perfect freedom, were assumptions 
wholly foreign to the Roman and Renaissance texts» but it was possible to find 
in them an exaltation of the idea of civic liberty (1998, 19). 
 
V. Conclusion. 
Early modern law based Utopia was not the secular hell created by twentieth-
century totalitarian regimes. As Miriam Eliav-Feldon stated, «the Renaissance 
social reformers were blissfully ignorant of the experience of twentieth-century 
civilization with totalitarian regimes» (1982, 125). Utopian societies are 
authoritative but not totalitarian, though «the [most important] tendency in this 
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century has been to equate utopia with force, violence, and totalitarianism» 
(Sargent, 1982, 568). In this sense, Barbara Goodwin argues: «although a 
minority of utopians have seen coercion and even violence as a lamentable but 
necessary means to change, a survey of utopian literature does not establish 
anything approaching a necessary and universal association of utopianism with 
coercive means» (1980, 395). 
 
Freedom from arbitrary dominance may help to understand how respect for 
human rights has been an important part in early modern utopia thought. 
Furthermore, the achievement of freedom from arbitrary dominance is a 
contemporary political ideal that leads us to a new view of society. In this sense, 
if someone, nowadays, wished to use utopian thought in order to propose a 
radical social reform, he or she cannot to forget the old and modern senses of 
freedom, the difference between the public and private spheres and the 
significance of social pluralism. A contemporary Utopia could not limit the 
political participation rights of citizens and could not enact a rule for every action 
a man can do in order to get security and a higher level of certainty because 
then, as J.C. Davis asserts, «utopian formality becomes a prison, absolute in its 
confinement» (1993a, 29). The problem is that today the light of eunomia has 
lost influence in favor of the shadows of dystopia and caconomia. Human rights 
are less important than national security. Utopian thought should be able to 
overcome these shadows because as John Rawls says in The Law of Peoples: 
«the limits of the possible are not given by the actual, for we can to a greater or 
lesser extent change political and social institutions and much else. Hence we 
have to rely on conjecture and speculation, arguing as best we can that the 
social world we envision is feasible and might actually exist, if not now then at 
some future time under happier circumstances» (1999, 12). 
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